

the Society of Mind that do not act methodically  
leled as machines, that is, boxes in the flow chart  
by algorithms (metaphorical machines). Only the  
iety of Mind (Perception and Reason) are modeled  
emotion, which is not methodical and predictable,  
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whelming evidence that the mind does not work  
ed. We know that reason and emotion go hand in  
nly if emotion is present (B1, Damasio 1994). But  
t emotion disrupts reason, and models of reason-  
g, and rational action do not include emotion. We  
entral executive center, yet there are still models of  
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s and that there is no central place where it is lo-  
els of language in which lexical memory is concep-  
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lty psychology has had such a hold on our imagi-  
s to be our default mode of thinking about the  
sive counterevidence. The Folk Theory of Faculty  
itive unconscious. It is not something that we can  
ier into an organic whole many of our most com-  
nd and social stereotypes. It is part of our auto-  
s embodied in our synapses. We are unlikely to

le to revise or replace this folk theory, but we will  
still other metaphors. Like time, events, and cau-  
omprehended metaphorically.

## 20

# Kantian Morality

For over two centuries now, Kantian moral theory has been the paradigm of pure rational morality. Kant believed that he had shown how absolute, universally binding moral principles can be derived from the essence of what he called “pure practical reason.” But if, as we have argued, there is no such thing as “pure reason,” then Kant must have actually been doing something quite different from unpacking the essence of pure practical reason. What he was doing, we shall argue, was brilliantly working out the entailments of a close-knit cluster of conceptual metaphors that he inherited from Western philosophy and the Judeo-Christian moral tradition.

Morality in this tradition is based on what we have been calling the Strict Father model of the family. As we saw, when this Strict Father model is fleshed out with a number of independently motivated metaphors for morality, we then have Strict Father family morality, which has long been dominant both within the Western moral tradition and in conservative versions of Christianity (A1, Lakoff 1996a, chap. 14).

Kant uses this Strict Father family morality as the key element of a theory of morality in general. In other words, Kant derives all morality as a version of Strict Father family morality. Kant understood this model perfectly, if only implicitly, and he worked with unparalleled insight to develop the implications of the basic metaphors that define this morality. Obviously, Kant thought that he was doing something quite different, namely, analyzing the essence of pure practical reason, and he would have vehemently denied the metaphorical character of morality, at least at the level of the fundamental moral principles he claimed to have identified. Nonetheless, as we will see, his moral theory does not reveal the

a priori rational foundations of a universal morality. Rather, it is a working out of the logic of a small set of conceptual metaphors that define mainstream Western morality and that are based on the Strict Father model of the family.

Our goal here is to lay out in detail the conceptual superstructure of Kant's moral theory. We hope to show that Kant's most characteristic ethical doctrines all arise from his unique integration of four folk theories and metaphors common to his age. Our analysis of Kant's conceptual system reveals that his moral theory derives from the following sources:

1. The Folk Theory of Essences
2. Strict Father family morality
3. The Society of Mind metaphor
4. The Family of Man metaphor

It is remarkable that, from such an ordinary collection of commonplace metaphorical ideas, Kant developed his most striking and original moral doctrines, for example:

- Morality must be based on pure reason alone.
- The source of morality is our capacity to give moral laws to ourselves.
- All moral laws are universally binding.
- We have an absolute duty to treat rational creatures as ends-in-themselves and never as means only. → **FUCK MARRIAGE**
- Morality can consist only of categorical imperatives such as "Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law."

It is Kant's genius that such deep, complex, and subtle doctrines could come from such simple, and at the time intuitive and commonly understood, origins. Let us now turn to the task of showing exactly how these and other key tenets of Kantian moral theory arise from those four common metaphors and folk theories. We will begin by recalling the central elements of the Strict Father view of family morality.

### Kant's Strict Father Morality

Kant's ethical theory is a rationalist version of Strict Father morality, which Kant combines with the Family of Man metaphor and the Society of Mind

metaphor from faculty psychology (Chapter 19). In this way, as we will see, Universal Reason becomes the Strict Father who issues universal moral commandments that are to be followed by all rational creatures.

Recall that the Strict Father model embodies its own very distinctive morality—a morality defined by such metaphors as moral authority, moral strength, moral obedience, moral boundaries, moral freedom, moral essence, moral purity, moral self-interest, and moral nurturance.

As difficult and complicated as Kant's moral theory is, its conceptual structure is actually Strict Father family morality (1) tied to rationality by faculty psychology, with Reason playing the role of the Strict Father, and (2) universalized to all human beings via the Family of Man metaphor. Understanding Kant's moral theory in this way makes it possible to explain three things: first, what sense it makes to regard Reason as the author of moral precepts; second, how Strict Father family morality can come to be internalized as the basis for a universal rational morality; and, third, what it means to give moral laws to yourself.

### Reason as a Strict Father in the Society of Mind Metaphor

Let us think back for a moment to our discussion of the Society of Mind metaphor. We saw that there was a moral component built into the very nature of faculty psychology. Reason, which governs the Society of Mind and is responsible for its well-being, is a moral authority; it knows what is best for the society as a whole and has the duty to issue directives to the members of the society specifying what each needs to do to ensure the well-being of the community. Correspondingly, it is the duty of other community members to obey the dictates of Reason.

Will, who is responsible for what the body does, has a moral obligation to obey the commands of Reason. Passion, who does not typically act morally and who is Reason's antagonist, struggles with Reason over the control of Will. To resist Passion, Will must be strong. This requires that Will be disciplined, and it is the duty of Reason to do everything it can to provide that discipline.

What we see here is the metaphorical imposition of a version of the Strict Father model of family morality onto the Society of Mind. The metaphorical mapping is as follows:

## THE REASON AS STRICT FATHER METAPHOR

<u>Strict Father Family</u>		<u>Society Of Mind</u>
Family	→	The Mind
Father	→	Reason
The Child	→	Will
External Evil	→	Passion

This mapping applies to the following knowledge about the Strict Father family:

The father knows what is best and is thus a moral authority; he has to teach the child right from wrong, to make the child as disciplined as possible so that the child will become strong enough to overcome external evils, and to tell the child in specific cases what to do. The child has the moral obligation to obey the father.

The metaphor maps this commonplace knowledge of Strict Father family morality onto the moral aspects of the Society of Mind metaphor, as follows:



Reason knows what is best and is thus a moral authority; he has to teach Will right from wrong, to make Will as disciplined as possible, to make Will strong enough to overcome passion, and to tell Will in specific cases what to do. Will has the moral obligation to obey Reason.

Given the Reason As Strict Father metaphor, which is built into the Society of Mind metaphor, we can now make sense of two important aspects of Kant's moral theory. (1) Why is Reason the author of moral precepts? Reason is a metaphorical strict father in the Society of Mind and has the moral authority as well as the responsibility to issue moral precepts. (2) What does it mean to give moral precepts to yourself? Recall that each person's mind is conceptualized as a Society of Mind. Reason and Will both reside within each of us. When Reason gives moral precepts to Will, that is equivalent to each of us giving moral precepts to ourselves. This is the capacity Kant calls "autonomy." Each of us is morally autonomous, on Kant's view, insofar as we do not get our moral precepts from others but instead get them from our own capacity to reason. It is in this sense that we are "self-legislating": we give laws to ourselves.

Kant contrasts such moral autonomy with "heteronomy," that is, having someone or something other than your own Reason tell you what you should

do and cause you to do. It is God, or even your parents, or your desires, and so on. It is that you become free, including that of your own will.

This is the epitome of moral influence, which is empathy (or "fellow feeling") and moral worth, a reflective of Reason and

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Society Of Mind

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do and cause you to act. This "other" could be another person, a government,  
 God, or even your own body, that is, your own feelings, passions, habits, de-  
 sires, and so on. It is only by being rational, by obeying the dictates of Reason,  
that you become free—autonomous—and independent of any alien influence,  
including that of your own body.

This is the epitome of rationalism in morality. The body is seen as a foreign  
 influence, which is not really your essential self. For this reason, acting out of  
 empathy (or "fellow-feeling") is a mode of action that, for Kant, "is without  
 any moral worth," since it is based on feeling and does not follow from any di-  
 rective of Reason alone.

## The Role of the Folk Theory of Essences

One of the hallmarks of Kant's theory is the insistence that all moral laws are  
 universal and must issue from a universal moral reason. What makes it natural  
 for Kant to reach such conclusions?

As an Enlightenment figure, Kant accepted the Folk Theory of Essences as an  
 obvious truth. The essence of human beings was, of course, the capacity for  
 Reason. Since an essence is the same for all the members of the category de-  
 fined by that essence, it follows that all human beings have the *same* capacity  
 for Reason; that is, we all have the same Reason, and so Reason is universal.

Since all human minds were conceptualized in the Enlightenment via the So-  
 ciety of Mind metaphor, Reason, in that metaphor, is therefore Universal Rea-  
 son. And since Reason, in that metaphor, is the author of moral precepts, those  
 moral precepts must be universal—Universal Moral Laws!

Here we see the Folk Theory of Essence, Strict Father morality, and faculty  
 psychology all working together to give rise to the idea that there are universal  
 moral laws given to us by universal reason, which resides in each of us. By  
 virtue of this metaphorical conjunction, Strict Father family morality is seen as  
incorporated within every human being. What needs to be shown next is how  
Kant extends Strict Father family morality from the internal to the external,  
 that is, how he makes it govern all moral relations among all human beings.

## The Family of Man Metaphor

Kant's solution makes use the Family of Man metaphor, according to **which all**  
 human beings belong to a single family and are all brothers and sisters. **This**

metaphor entails that we all have a moral obligation to treat each other as we would family members, according to an ideal model of what a family is.

#### THE FAMILY OF MAN METAPHOR

Family	→	Humankind
Each Child	→	Each Human Being
Other Children	→	Every Other Human Being

This simple mapping has a number of important entailments:

Family Moral Relations	→	Universal Moral Relations
Family Moral Authority	→	Universal Moral Authority
Family Moral Laws	→	Universal Moral Laws
Family Moral Nurturance	→	Universal Moral Nurturance

In other words, this metaphor projects family moral structure onto a universal moral structure. For example, it is a consequence of this metaphor that just as each child in the family is subject to the same moral authority and moral laws, so each person in the world is subject to the same moral authority and moral laws. The obligation to nurture others in the family gets transformed into an obligation to nurture all humankind.

This metaphor, however, is very general. It does not say anything about what type of family humankind is to be. We, the authors, grew up with a version of the Family of Man metaphor in which the family was to be a Nurturant Parent family, not a Strict Father family. As a result we saw this metaphor as saying that we all have a primary obligation to reach out in empathy toward all human beings and to offer whatever nurturance is in our capacities. This is not Kant's version.

Kant had the Strict Father version of this metaphor. For Kant, the Family of Man is a Strict Father family. The universal moral laws are the precepts a strict father would give. As we shall see, every major tenet of his moral philosophy is a consequence of his Strict Father family morality.

### Universal Morality as Strict Father Morality

Let us begin by fleshing out the Family of Man metaphor as Kant does, by imposing upon it a Strict Father interpretation, in which the family moral authority is the father, the father's commands are the family moral laws, and nurturance is the nurturance needed to become morally strong. To arrive at a

Kantian version of the Family constraints to the mapping given

Family Moral Authority = The  
Father's Commands = Family  
Nurturance = Nurturance To

Given this, the submapping

Family Moral Authority →

becomes

Father →

Similarly, by such substitutions

Father's Commands →  
Obedience To Father →

Putting all this together, the Kantian metaphor goes like this:

#### THE STRICT FATHER METAPHOR

##### Strict Father Family

Family  
Father  
Each Child  
Other Children  
Father's Commands  
Obedience To Father  
Family Moral Relations  
Family Nurturance To Be  
Morally Strong

We are now one step away from Kant's moral theory. What is the relationship between Kant's versions of the Family of Man metaphor. It is this relationship

... a moral obligation to treat each other as we  
... to an ideal model of what a family is.

#### FAMILY OF MAN METAPHOR

... kind  
... human Being  
... Other Human Being

... of important entailments:

- Universal Moral Relations
- Universal Moral Authority
- Universal Moral Laws
- Universal Moral Nurturance

... projects family moral structure onto a universal  
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... mmands are the family moral laws, and  
... ed to become morally strong. To arrive at a

Kantian version of the Family of Man metaphor, we thus add the following  
constraints to the mapping given above:

Family Moral Authority = The Father  
Father's Commands = Family Moral Laws  
Nurturance = Nurturance To Be Morally Strong

Given this, the submapping

Family Moral Authority → Universal Moral Authority

becomes

Father → Universal Moral Authority

Similarly, by such substitutions, we arrive at the new submappings:

Father's Commands → Universal Moral Laws  
Obedience To Father → Obedience To Universal Moral Laws

Putting all this together, the Kantian Strict Father version of the Family of Man  
metaphor goes like this:

#### THE STRICT FATHER FAMILY OF MAN METAPHOR

<u>Strict Father Family</u>		<u>Humankind</u>
Family	→	Humankind
Father	→	Universal Moral Authority
Each Child	→	Each Human Being
Other Children	→	Every Other Human Being
Father's Commands	→	Universal Moral Laws
Obedience To Father	→	Obedience To Universal Moral Laws
Family Moral Relations	→	Universal Moral Relations
Family Nurturance To Be Morally Strong	→	Universal Nurturance To Be Morally Strong

We are now one step away from being able to state the metaphoric structure  
of Kant's moral theory. What remains to be seen is the relationship between  
Kant's versions of the Family of Man metaphor and the Society of Mind  
metaphor. It is this relationship that is the basis for Kant's claim that morality

is founded on universal human reason issuing absolute and universally valid moral commands.

In the Strict Father interpretation of the Society of Mind metaphor, Reason is metaphorically a Strict Father, and therefore the Moral Authority.

Father → Reason  
Father = Moral Authority

Therefore,

Moral Authority = Reason

According to the Folk Theory of Essences, Reason is Universal Reason. Therefore,

Moral Authority = Universal Reason

This then, fills out the central metaphor by which Kant understands universal moral reason as a strict father who issues universal moral laws. Bringing all of this together, we get the following complex metaphor that defines Kantian moral theory:

THE UNIVERSAL MORALITY AS STRICT  
FATHER MORALITY METAPHOR

<u>Strict Father Morality</u>		<u>Universal Rational Morality</u>
Family	→	Humankind
Each Child	→	Each Human Being
Other Children	→	Every Other Human Being
Father	→	Universal Reason
Father's Moral Authority	→	Universal Moral Authority
Father's Commands	→	Universal Moral Laws
Obedience To Father	→	Obedience To Universal Moral Laws
Family Moral Relations	→	Universal Moral Relations
Family Nurturance To	→	Universal Nurturance To Be Morally
Be Morally Strong		Strong

Stated as such, this seems like a strange and arbitrary metaphor, an odd way to conceptualize universal rational morality. Yet this mapping is a product of

completely sensible parts. Once assembled them, we can discern mapping.

At this point, we can see why major moral doctrines. All of metaphors.

In light of this mapping, we Christian moral tradition accounts as a form of Strict Father moral interpretation of this tradition. He issues absolute commands. God's human creatures are subject to God's will, which wrongdoings and rewards moral into what God commands us what is required by God. God that defines our proper relationship violates this ideal trespasses are commanded to love and help them achieve we

Kant's ethics is a sophisticated lies this interpretation of the idea that morality comes from his moral tradition and tries to what Kant does is to replace Universal Reason possessed laws, are thus transformed into Reason. Christianity's split over into the Kantian picture. The strength of will necessary as the strength of will necessary low Reason, and thus to do or

Given such a "replacement" a very different analysis of Ka

evil or temptation, no matter how strong they might be. For Will to do what Reason commands, it must be strong enough to fend off the assault of bodily passions, needs, and inclinations.

We can now see why Kant has the account of virtue that he has. Kant understands all virtue as the principal virtue of Strict Father morality, namely, Moral Strength. "Hence virtue is the moral strength of the will of a human being in obeying his duty" (C2, Kant, *Metaphysics* 405). Thus, virtue requires that man have "control over himself" (*Metaphysics* 408) and "not let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations. . . . For unless reason takes the reins of government in its own hands, feelings and inclinations play the master over man" (*Metaphysics* 408).

Kant's Strict Father morality gives primacy to doing one's duty regardless of any forces influencing action in a contrary fashion. Consequently, Kant is left with a narrow and restrictive conception of virtue as no more than the moral strength to do one's duty. In classical moral theory, virtue is a state of character concerned with habits that allow one to choose wisely and well, typically with balance. But Kant's emphasis on the Moral Strength metaphor forces him to see virtue as operating primarily in the battle between the body and reason:

Now, fortitude is the capacity and resolved purpose to resist a strong but unjust opponent; and with regard to the opponent of the moral dispositions within us, such fortitude is virtue. (*Metaphysics* 380)

Virtue is the strength of a man's maxim in obeying his duty. All strength is known only by the obstacles it can overcome; and in the case of virtue the obstacles are the natural inclinations, which can come into conflict with moral purpose (*Metaphysics* 394)

Just as we would expect in any Strict Father morality, virtue as moral strength shows itself through self-discipline and self-constraint. In his *Lectures on Ethics*, therefore, Kant lists as one of our duties that of "self-mastery":

Here is the rule: Seek to maintain self-mastery; thou wilt then be fit to perform thy self-regarding duties. There is in man a certain rabble of acts of sensibility which has to be vigilantly disciplined, and kept under strict rule, even to the point of applying force to make it submit to the ordinances of governance. This rabble does not naturally conform to the rule of the understanding, yet it is good only in so far as it does so conform. (C2, Kant, *Lectures* 138)

Kant follows out the implications of taking out all of the forms of constraint, forbearance, and self-control, that bear on our sensuous nature. A moral law must "divide them," "stamp out the passions," "subordinate the motives," and "discipline himself morally." The law asserts authority over himself, his imagination, his feelings, but his imagination carries him away, he yields willingly to his senses, and, unaided, he is lost. (*Lectures* 140).

Kant goes to great lengths to describe the difference between bodily and rational natures. Our bodily nature is like that of brutes, if they had their way, so that they would have the strength to overcome this onslaught of passions. It requires self-control, self-reliance, and self-discipline, virtues only as a consequence of the rational nature. In Kant's powerful explanation of why we are rational, he says:

Do not become the vassals of men. Do not suffer to be trodden underfoot by others with impunity. Incur no debt, no want of security. Accept no favors which you are obliged to repay. Do not flatterers nor (what really differs from flattery) sycophants. Be thrifty so that you may not become destitute. Do not merely crying out in bodily pain, are unbecomingly aware that you deserve pain. (*Metaphysics* 380)

Notice that what Kant is really describing is the condition of not being dependent on others, in a moral sense. If you are strong, one must be able to proceed on one's own. If you are weak, you put you in a dependent relationship—especially needy, becoming a dependent on others. The loss of self-control—is to be avoided whenever possible. The conditions for being autonomous are the conditions for being strong.

## Moral

Kantian morality, like all Strict Father morality, is located at the Event-Structure version of the Event-Structure metaphor. It is understood metaphorically as self-protection, self-discipline, or "ends." The term *end* for the Event-Structure metaphor as a destination.

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Kant follows out the implications of this metaphor of self-discipline, spelling out all of the forms of constraint, force, and vigilance that we must bring to bear on our sensuous nature. A moral person must “weaken the opposing forces,” “divide them,” “stamp out the tendency which arises from sensuous motive,” and “discipline himself morally” (*Lectures* 139). If a person “surrenders authority over himself, his imagination has free play; he cannot discipline himself, but his imagination carries him away by the laws of association; he yields willingly to his senses, and, unable to curb them, he becomes their toy” (*Lectures* 140).

Kant goes to great lengths to describe the battle that rages between our bodily and rational natures. Our bodily needs and wants would reduce us to mere brutes, if they had their way, so that the moral will must develop remarkable strength to overcome this onslaught of temptation. Moral strength thus requires self-control, self-reliance, and self-discipline. These virtues, which are virtues only as a consequence of the metaphor of Moral Strength, are evident in Kant’s powerful explanation of why various forms of servility are immoral.

Do not become the vassals of men. Do not suffer your rights to be trampled underfoot by others with impunity. Incur no debts for which you cannot provide full security. Accept no favors which you might do without. Do not be parasites nor flatterers nor (what really differs from these only in degree) beggars. Therefore, be thrifty so that you may not become destitute. Complaining and whimpering, even merely crying out in bodily pain, are unworthy of you, and most of all when you are aware that you deserve pain. (*Metaphysics* 436)

Notice that what Kant is really describing here is the necessity, on his view, of not being dependent on others, insofar as that is possible. To be morally strong, one must be able to proceed on one’s own, without help. Anything that puts you in a dependent relationship—such as incurring debt, becoming financially needy, becoming a dependent servant, and even letting bodily pain take control—is to be avoided whenever possible. Self-control, self-mastery, and full autonomy are the conditions for being able to act morally.

### *Moral Boundaries*

Kantian morality, like all Strict Father morality, is a morality of constraint. In the location version of the Event-Structure metaphor, purposeful actions are understood metaphorically as self-propelled motions along paths toward destinations, or “ends.” The term *end* for Kant is a purpose conceptualized via the Event-Structure metaphor as a destination. From the perspective of the Event-

Structure metaphor, morality for Kant is primarily a matter of determining what constraints there are on these metaphorically defined purposeful actions—what our destinations (or ends) should be, what means (or paths) we are permitted to take toward achieving those ends, and what forces affect our motion as we move metaphorically toward those ends.

Kant sees moral obligations as imposing forces that constrain us: We are “bound” by duty and we are morally “compelled” to act in certain prescribed ways. There are moral laws that are “binding” on all rational creatures.

Reason commands, dictates, and orders the will to choose in accordance with certain constraining moral principles and laws. Evils, both internal and external, are strong forces that would drive us off the straight path, overcome our reason and will, and make us slaves of our passions. They would force the will to act against reason. Therefore, the will needs a strong constraint to follow moral laws and stay on the path that leads to moral ends.

### *Moral Freedom*

As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the metaphor of Moral Freedom is one of those metaphors for morality given priority by the Strict Father model of the family. It is based on the Location Event-Structure metaphor, where purposeful action is self-propelled motion to a destination (an “end”), and freedom of action is unimpeded motion. In the metaphor, immoral actions are motions that interfere with others’ reaching of their ends, that is, they keep others from acting to achieve their purposes.

The reason this is given priority by the Strict Father model of the family is that, in Strict Father morality, being self-reliant through being self-disciplined is a primary value, and the self-disciplined person cannot become self-reliant if people are interfering with the achieving his or her ends.

Moral Freedom, like the other metaphors that form the Strict Father complex, is a localized metaphor. It is not integrated into a consistent moral system. For example, it, in itself, says nothing about whether it is immoral to interfere with someone who has immoral ends.

Though Kant was using the Strict Father system with its isolated, localized metaphors, he was also building a systematic and consistent moral conceptual system. For Kant, the metaphor of Moral Freedom was not isolated and localized, but stood at the very center of his moral theory.

For Kant, the metaphor of Moral Freedom is intimately tied to the notion of a moral end: Choosing any end at all is, by definition, a matter of free will.

You haven’t really “chosen” the end if you are not free. The possibility of choosing moral ends presupposes freedom. Kant says, “An end is an object of free choice” (Metaphysics 381). Part of the end must be freely chosen. Inhibiting freedom, therefore, is inconsistent with the possibility of choosing moral ends.

Since all moral ends issue from Reason, it is Reason that is the source of freedom. If Reason were constrained by anything external, it would not be free and thus could not be the source of freedom. What we most essentially are, so the freedom of our essence.

### *Moral Ends and Ends-in-Themselves*

The notion of “ends-in-themselves” is not a central feature of all Kant’s ideas, and yet it lies at the heart of his moral theory. For him, morality ultimately comes down to the pursuit of “ends-in-themselves.” What sense can we put on this? Most of us think of ends as things we can reach. In the metaphorical destinations we are trying to reach, we are trying to follow a path of action. Ordinarily, we cannot conceive of a metaphorical end point with no path that leads to it. An “end-in-itself” is not one of our ordinary everyday concepts. It is the very essence of morality. How can this be?

Moreover, Kant thinks that everyone has a moral duty to treat people as “ends-in-themselves.” And how does this idea emerge from the metaphors and folk theories given above?

Consider ordinary ends, which we have to choose freely whether to pursue or not to achieve. For example, suppose you have a window that is open into your room. You open the window and the wind comes in. Your action of opening the window is a means to an end. This end is not a “self-subsisting end” to capture the

An end-in-itself, Kant says, is not like this. It is not a means to an end. It is not unrealized. You do not and cannot bring it about. It is this a “self-subsisting end” to capture the

is primarily a matter of determining metaphorsically defined purposeful actions should be, what means (or paths) we use to reach those ends, and what forces affect our progress toward those ends.

Imposing forces that constrain us: We are "compelled" to act in certain prescribed ways "binding" on all rational creatures.

Orders the will to choose in accordance with principles and laws. Evils, both internal and external, drive us off the straight path, overcome the strength of our passions. They would force the will to choose what it needs a strong constraint to follow. What leads to moral ends.

## Freedom

In this chapter, the metaphor of Moral Freedom is given priority by the Strict Father model over the Event-Structure metaphor, where purpose is directed toward a destination (an "end"), and freedom is the ability to choose one's path. In the metaphor, immoral actions are failures in reaching of their ends, that is, they keep us from achieving our purposes.

In the Strict Father model of the family is self-reliant through being self-disciplined. A person who is not self-reliant cannot become self-reliant if he or she does not follow his or her ends.

Metaphors that form the Strict Father community are integrated into a consistent moral system. Nothing about whether it is immoral to pursue certain ends.

The Event-Structure system with its isolated, localized metaphors is not systematic and consistent moral conceptualization. Moral Freedom was not isolated and localized in the Event-Structure theory.

Freedom is intimately tied to the notion of choice, by definition, a matter of free will.

You haven't really "chosen" the end if you are forced to adopt it. The very possibility of choosing moral ends presupposes freedom to make the choice. As he says, "An end is an object of free choice" (*Metaphysics* 38). "Now I can indeed be forced by others to actions which are directed as means to end, but I can never be forced by others to have an end; I alone can make something an end for myself" (*Metaphysics* 381). Part of the *essence* of any moral end is that it has been freely chosen. Inhibiting freedom, therefore, is for Kant an interference with the possibility of choosing moral ends.

Since all moral ends issue from Reason, it follows that Reason must be free. If Reason were constrained by anything external to it, it could not choose freely and thus could not be the source of moral ends. Since Reason defines what we most essentially are, so the freedom to choose moral ends is part of our essence.

## Moral Ends and Ends-in-Themselves

The notion of "ends-in-themselves" is notoriously the most esoteric and obscure of all Kant's ideas, and yet it lies at the very heart of his entire moral theory. For him, morality ultimately comes down to always treating others as "ends-in-themselves." What sense can we possibly make of an "end-in-itself"? Most of us think of ends as things we can achieve through our actions, as metaphorical destinations we are trying to reach, that is, as end points on a path of action. Ordinarily, we cannot conceive of an end with no means, of a metaphorical end point with no path that it lies at the end of. An "end-in-itself" is not one of our ordinary everyday concepts. And yet Kant takes it to be the very essence of morality. How can this be?

Moreover, Kant thinks that everyone has an absolutely binding universal moral duty to treat people as "ends-in-themselves." What, exactly is an "end-in-itself"? And how does this idea emerge out of the four commonplace metaphors and folk theories given above?

Consider ordinary ends, which we have no moral duty to pursue, ends we can choose freely whether to pursue or not. Often, these are ends we can achieve. For example, suppose you have it as your purpose to let some fresh air into your room. You open the window and your end is realized: The fresh air comes in. Your action of opening the window made your end real.

An end-in-itself, Kant says, is not like this. There is never a time at which it is realized. You do not and cannot bring it about by your actions. Kant calls this a "self-subsisting end" to capture the idea that it is prior to and indepen-

dent of your desires and actions. This makes the concept seem mysterious. How can it be an "end" at all, if it has a prior existence independent of anything you do or even desire?

To answer such questions, we need to think first of what a moral end is. It is a morally permissible or obligatory purpose that we try to achieve through our actions. What defines what moral purposes are? Kant's answer is Universal Reason, which defines the category of universally obligatory or permissible moral purposes. By the Folk Theory of Essences, this category of moral purposes (that is, "ends") must have an essence—the essence of what makes something a moral end.

Here the logic of the Folk Theory of Essences enters. For something to exist "in itself" it must (1) not be caused by anything else and (2) must be caused only by itself. Essences, as defined by the folk theory, have just this strange property: They exist outside of time. They have always been there and always will be there. Nothing external causes them. But how can they "cause themselves"? The answer comes in two parts. First, since every member is in the category by virtue of having the properties of the essence, none of the category members would exist without it. Hence the essence is the causal source of all members of the category. Second, the essence is itself a category member, since it obviously has all the properties of the essence. Thus, all essences are self-causing and not caused by anything else, and so exist in themselves. (Kant uses the term *self-subsisting*.)

Since the essence of moral ends is an essence, it exists in itself. Moreover, the essence of moral ends is in the category of moral ends, so it is a moral end-in-itself. And since every moral end is an end, the essence of moral ends is an end-in-itself.

So far, so good. But Kant claims that *people* are ends-in-themselves. Given that the essence of moral ends is an end-in-itself, how does Kant get to the claim that *people*—all people—are ends-in-themselves? Notice that if all people have as part of their essence the essence of moral ends, then people become ends-in-themselves. We are now one short step away. For Kant, Universal Reason is the causal source of all moral ends. As such, it is the essence of all moral ends. Since all people have Universal Reason as part of their essence, they all have the essence of moral ends as part of their essence. Hence, all human beings are, by their rational nature, ends-in-themselves. And from that it follows that, because they are by nature rational beings, they are not means for any other end.

The logic of essences explains what might appear to be an anomaly in the notion that people can be ends-in-themselves. Notice that it is not people who

are self-causing here. It is Universal Reason with which we are concerned, since it is an essence.

This is the structure of the conceptual system that was implicit in his thinking. His conclusion is that (1) the Folk Theory of Essences, (2) the nature of Universal Reason as a source of morality. The main element of the Folk Theory of Essences, one of the four conceptual elements of his thought.

To show exactly how this logic works in detail, we will examine the logical structure of this aspect of Kantian thought. A category not in Kant's technical sense, but in the philosophical sense. A category is a kind of thing. It is a concept that characterizes the essence of the category. Kant's notion of an end-in-itself. What has to be shown is that it could exist "in-itself" independent of the desire for it, and (2) why such an "end-in-self" is an end for itself, not the desire or purpose of any particular person.

#### THE FOLK THEORY OF ESSENCES

An essence of a category is not caused by anything else. Every essence is a member of the category it is the essence of. An essence of a category is the causal source of all members of the category; since it defines the category, the category would not exist without it.

Since an essence is in the category it is an end-in-itself. It is the causal source of all members of the category. Every essence exists "in itself" because it is self-causing and not caused by anything else.

The essence of a category exists as a member of the category. Since categories and their essences are part of the same system, they are categories and essences for each other.

#### MORAL ENDS

Moral ends form a category. Therefore, there is an essence of moral ends.

As an essence, it exists in itself.

As a member of the category of moral ends, it is a moral end-in-itself.

A moral end-in-itself is an end-in-itself.

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This is the structure of the conceptual system that Kant took for granted,  
that was implicit in his thinking. His conclusion comes from three sources: (1)  
the Folk Theory of Essences, (2) the nature of moral ends, and (3) Universal  
Reason as a source of morality. The main element in all this structure is the  
Folk Theory of Essences, one of the four conceptual cornerstones of Kantian  
thought.

To show exactly how this logic works in detail, we have reconstructed the  
logical structure of this aspect of Kantian thought. We will be using the word  
*category* not in Kant's technical sense, but in the more commonplace philo-  
sophical sense. A category is a kind of thing. It is defined by a concept, and  
that concept characterizes the essence of the category. Here is the logic behind  
Kant's notion of an end-in-itself. What has to be shown here is (1) how an end  
could exist "in-itself" independent of the desires and purposes of any being  
and (2) why such an "end-in-self" is an end for everyone, when it need not be  
the desire or purpose of any particular person.

#### THE FOLK THEORY OF ESSENCES

An essence of a category is not caused by anything else.

Every essence is a member of the category it is an essence of.

An essence of a category is the causal source of all the members of the cat-  
egory; since it defines the category, the category and all its members  
would not exist without it.

Since an essence is in the category it is an essence of, and since it is the  
causal source of all members of the category, it is "self-causing."

Every essence exists "in itself" because it is self-causing and not caused by  
anything else.

The essence of a category exists as a member of that category "in itself."

Since categories and their essences are part of what defines Universal Rea-  
son, they are categories and essences *for everyone*.

#### MORAL ENDS

Moral ends form a category. Therefore, there is an essence of that category,  
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As an essence, it exists in itself.

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A moral end-in-itself is an end-in-itself.

The essence of moral ends is an end-in-itself.

Since an end-in-itself is the essence of the category of all ends, and since categories and their essences are the same for everyone, it follows that an end-in-itself is an end for everyone.

#### UNIVERSAL REASON AS THE SOURCE OF MORALITY

All moral ends follow from Universal Reason.

Therefore, Universal Reason is the causal source of all moral ends.

Therefore, Universal Reason is the essence of all moral ends.

Therefore, Universal Reason exists as an end-in-itself.

Universal Reason is the essence of our rational nature.

Therefore, rational nature exists as an end-in-itself.

All human beings have a rational nature.

Therefore, all human beings exist as ends-in-themselves.

Therefore, every human being is an end for everyone.

Therefore, no human being exists as a means to serve some other end.

In practical terms, here is what Kant means when he says that we should act only so as to respect rational nature as an end-in-itself. Suppose I were to treat you as a means to some end of mine. Under what conditions would I be treating you as an end-in-itself? Only if I engage your reason to determine whether my end is a moral end for you and to use your freedom to choose to be used as a means for my end. To do otherwise is to deny you the use of your freedom and reason and thereby deny you your status as an end-in-itself.

We are now in a position to understand what Kant means when he says, "Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will" (*Grounding* 428).

He does not mean that no one can ever be used as a means. Suppose I hire you to paint my house, and you freely agree to do so. I am using you as a means to get my house painted, but Kant would find nothing immoral about this, since I am not violating your freedom. Though I use you as a means to one of my ends, I still recognize you as an end-in-itself. That is, since you are rational, you contain the essence of all moral ends. That includes freedom to choose your own ends, and I am not impinging on that. If, however, I were to put a gun to your head and make you paint my house, then I would be violating your ability to choose your own moral ends. I would be assaulting the locus of morality itself in you. That is what it means *not* to treat you as an "end-in-itself."

What Kant means is what allows each of us to have moral ends. It is what makes ends—and hence morality—autonomous.

We have suggested that the essence of moral ends, which is part of what we mean by rationality, is rational. As free rational beings, we are in a very condition of autonomy. This means that *we* are human beings as any other human being is any other human being in morality.

Kant also claims that the rationale. In *Str* it admits dignity. A person in that moral system chooses our own morality. As he says, "the late universal law" (

We can now see the state in which every person has two reasons: In it everyone else as an end, freedom of each person, other person. In the

Now morality is the end-in-itself, for on Ends. Hence, morality have dignity. (*Gro*

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#### AS THE SOURCE OF MORALITY

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What Kant means by being an “end-in-itself” is this: Universal Reason is what allows each of us to give moral laws to ourselves and hence to set our moral ends. It is what gives us freedom—freedom to choose our own moral ends—and hence makes us morally independent. Kant calls such moral independence “autonomy.”

We have suggested that the technical term *end-in-itself* refers to the essence of moral ends, which exists “in-itself.” This essence defines all moral ends and is part of what we most essentially are because it is a consequence of our being rational. As free rational beings, we are ends-in-ourselves because we are the very condition of any moral action whatsoever. The fact that Reason resides in us means that *we* are what makes any moral action possible at all. To treat any human being as anything but an end-in-itself is to violate the very condition of morality.

Kant also claims that being an end-in-itself is the basis of all dignity. Here is the rationale. In Strict Father morality, it is independence (autonomy) that permits dignity. A person who is dependent, who is not self-reliant, has no dignity in that moral system. For Kant, it is the freedom that comes from being able to choose our own moral ends that gives us moral independence and, hence, dignity. As he says, “the dignity of humanity consists just in its capacity to legislate universal law” (*Grounding* 440).

We can now see what Kant means by the “Kingdom of Ends.” It is the ideal state in which everyone acts morally. It is called the “Kingdom of Ends” for two reasons: In it everyone chooses only moral ends, and in it everyone treats everyone else as ends-in-themselves. In the Kingdom of Ends, therefore, the freedom of each person is maximized consistent with the freedom of every other person. In the Kingdom of Ends, everyone has dignity:

Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end-in-himself, for only thereby can he be a legislating member in the Kingdom of Ends. Hence, morality and humanity, insofar as it is capable of morality, alone have dignity. (*Grounding* 435)

#### *Autonomy and Internal Evil*

The metaphor of Moral Strength in the Strict Father model states that evil is a force in the world, both internal and external, and that one must be morally strong to stand up to it. If you are morally weak, you won’t be able to stand up to evil, and so you will fall before it. In Strict Father morality, the body, as the

seat of passion and desire, is a source of internal evil and so is a threat to moral action.

The application of Strict Father morality in the Society of Mind metaphor requires that Will be strong if it is to resist Passion and follow the dictates of Reason. In Kant's use of the Society of Mind metaphor, strength of Will is crucial for moral autonomy: You cannot give the law to yourself via your reason unless your will is strong enough to fend off internal evils, that is, bodily inclinations. We can see this in what Kant has to say about why it is immoral to let bodily passions overcome your rational capacities.

Consider, for example, Kant's account of our duties regarding "self-stupefaction through the immoderate use of food and drink" (*Metaphysics* 427) and "wanton self-abuse" (*Metaphysics* 424ff.). Are there things that I am not morally permitted to do to my own body, even if they do not harm others? What about drunkenness and gluttony? These are morally impermissible because they throw away our rational autonomy:

When a man is drunk, he is simply like a beast, not to be treated as a human being; when he is gorged with food, he is temporarily incapacitated for activities which require adroitness and deliberation in the use of his powers. (*Metaphysics* 427)

The vices of drunkenness and gluttony make us unfit for rational deliberation and thereby diminish, or even discard temporarily, our autonomy as rational beings. When we do such things, we use ourselves for pleasure and escape alone.

A similar violation of autonomy occurs, according to Kant, whenever we use our bodies nonpurposively for sexual pleasure. Kant asserts that our sexual attributes are given to us for the natural end of procreation. The use of these attributes in any nonpurposive way is a violation of the moral order, understood metaphorically as a "natural order." Kant claims that "the end of nature in the cohabitation of the sexes is propagation, i.e., preservation of the race," (*Metaphysics* 426) and sex not directed toward this end is immoral. Kant attacks every conceivable form of sexual activity that cannot be directed toward procreation. He claims that any "unnatural" or "unpurposive" use of one's sexual attributes is immoral because "a man gives up his personality (throws it away) when he uses himself merely as a means for the gratification of animal drive" (*Metaphysics* 425). Kant even goes so far as to argue that such misuse of sexuality is far worse even than suicide, which is another form of using oneself merely as a means. Suicide requires courage to end one's misery, but "when

one abandons himself entire object of unnatural gratification himself of all self-respect" (N

Given the vehemence of Kant's position where procreation is no heaps on masturbation, "who by imagining it, thus creating such awful cases, "fancy eng it reduces one's own person t

In Strict Father morality, nurturance is nurturance to be strict that they become morally weak nurturance serves a moral purpose strength, learn what is right through self-discipline.

The primary duty of nurturance is a "practical love of all mankind (as long as they are not immoral) a constant concern for the well-being of being "helpful to men in need happiness and without hoping for a question that must be answered why, beyond not harming others (morally permissible) ends moral beings require anything with their freedom, insofar as

Kant's answer to this question is the point of helping others in need morally and to realize their freedom in a way that lets them remain moral to help them develop moral freedom and morality.

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 himself of all self-respect" (*Metaphysics* 425).

Given the vehemence of Kant's attack on unpurposive sex with another per-  
 son where procreation is not possible, one can easily anticipate the scorn he  
 heaps on masturbation, "when a man is stimulated not by an actual object but  
 by imagining it, thus creating it himself unpurposively" (*Metaphysics* 425). In  
 such awful cases, "fancy engenders a desire contrary to an end of nature" and  
 it reduces one's own person to the status of a mere pleasure machine.

### Moral Nurturance

In Strict Father morality, nurturance is subservient to moral strength. Nurtu-  
 rance is nurturance to be strong. Raising or teaching someone in such a way  
 that they become morally weak is not nurturance. This is Kant's view. Nurtu-  
 rance serves a moral purpose. It is intended to help the child develop moral  
 strength, learn what is right (universally), and be able to realize moral ends  
 through self-discipline.

The primary duty of nurturance toward others is benevolence. Benevolence  
 is a "practical love of all mankind" that is "the duty to make the ends of others  
 (as long as they are not immoral) my own" (*Metaphysics* 450). Such benevo-  
 lent concern for the well-being of others expresses itself as beneficence, that is,  
 being "helpful to men in need according to one's means, for the sake of their  
 happiness and without hoping for anything thereby" (*Metaphysics* 452). The  
 question that must be answered in order to justify the duty of beneficence is  
 why, beyond not harming another person, I should have a duty to make their  
 (morally permissible) ends my ends. Why should the principle of respect for ra-  
 tional beings require anything more than leaving them alone (not interfering  
 with their freedom, insofar as they act morally)?

Kant's answer to this question stems from his Strict Father morality. The  
 point of helping others in need is that this makes it possible for them to act  
 morally and to realize their moral ends. It is not appropriate to help others in a  
 way that lets them remain morally weak and dependent. Rather, you are trying  
 to help them develop moral strength and the ability to pursue ends that realize  
 freedom and morality.

We have, for example, a duty to ourselves to develop our talents. Why? Be-  
 cause only if we develop our bodily and mental talents and abilities can we be  
 morally strong beings capable of realizing moral ends. Kant explains:

With regard to contingent (meritorious) duty to oneself, it is not enough that the action does not conflict with humanity in our own person as an end in itself; the action must also harmonize with this end. Now there are in humanity capacities for greater perfection which belong to the end that nature has in view as regards humanity in our own person. To neglect these capacities might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but would not be consistent with the advancement of this end. (*Grounding* 430)

In other words, self-fulfillment in itself is not a moral goal. Self-fulfillment is moral only when it makes you morally strong.

Our bodies and minds are not our own to dispose of as we please. We have a duty to be morally strong, to develop our moral capacities, and to seek moral perfection, since these are the very conditions for acting morally and being autonomous. Morality requires of us that we nurture ourselves, not merely out of self-interest, but even when it is difficult and painful to develop our talents and we would rather take the easier road. The end of human existence is morality—the autonomous, rational exercise of one's freedom in a way that treats all people as ends-in-themselves.

Self-nurturance is, then, the strengthening of your capacities—physical, mental, and moral—to enable yourself to pursue ends required by moral law. Nurturance serves moral strength, as required for the pursuit of moral perfection: “But as for what concerns perfection as a moral end, there is indeed . . . only one virtue (. . . moral strength of one's maxims). (*Metaphysics* 447)

### *The Categorical Imperative*

The term *categorical* means “absolute.” It contrasts with anything that is conditional, hypothetical, context-dependent, or contingent on personal desires. For Kant, a “hypothetical imperative” is a conditional requirement or command that depends on your purposes (i.e., your personal ends). By contrast, categorical imperatives place requirements on you regardless of what your personal ends might be.

Kant's concept of a categorical imperative comes directly out of Strict Father morality. The Strict Father (Universal Reason) issues certain commands, and the child (you) absolutely must follow them to the letter. Your needs are irrelevant. Your feelings are irrelevant. Your purposes are irrelevant. It is defined as being good for you:

There is one imperative which immediately commands us without having as its condition any other principle, namely, that we should act categorically. It is not concerned with the object of the action, but rather with the form of the law. (*Grounding* 416)

Being moral is doing your duty. Duty is the moral law and nothing else. There are no feelings, needs, or purposes you might have. The categorical imperative is a universal, unconditional moral law.

To get a sense of what Kant is proposing, here are four versions, all of which he considers equivalent:

1. Act only according to that maxim which you can will that it can become a universal law.
2. Act always so as to treat humanity, whether in your person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.
3. Act only according to those maxims which you can at the same time will to be universal laws for yourself.
4. Act so as to create a kingdom of ends.

The examples that Kant gives might be of a Nurturant Parent morality, or of a morality based on universal love, or just directives to be moral: you should act; treat people as ends-in-themselves; be fair; be a moral idealist.

But it is easy to see that these are not based on feelings of love, or empathy, or sympathy. First, if you follow these prescriptions, you are acting out of duty, not out of feelings such as love, or empathy, or sympathy. Second, these are universal, absolute commands. Third, they are categorical imperatives. Fourth, they are based on respect for the law, not on feelings or motives. Whatever the effects of following the law only out of respect for the law.

Second, these are universal, absolute commands. Third, they are categorical imperatives. Fourth, they are based on respect for the law, not on feelings or motives. Whatever the effects of following the law only out of respect for the law. Third, the imperative to treat people as ends-in-themselves, or to treat people as noble as a principle of respect, is universal.

orious) duty to oneself, it is not enough that the humanity in our own person as an end in itself; the in this end. Now there are in humanity capacities long to the end that nature has in view as regards neglect these capacities might perhaps be consistent with humanity as an end in itself, but would not be consistent with this end. (*Grounding* 430)

in itself is not a moral goal. Self-fulfillment is morally strong.

our own to dispose of as we please. We have a develop our moral capacities, and to seek moral conditions for acting morally and being autonomous that we nurture ourselves, not merely out of difficult and painful to develop our talents and road. The end of human existence is moral exercise of one's freedom in a way that treats all

engthening of your capacities—physical, mental—to pursue ends required by moral law. Nurture is required for the pursuit of moral perfection: action as a moral end, there is indeed . . . only one's maxims). (*Metaphysics* 447)

### Categorical Imperative

absolute." It contrasts with anything that is conditional, dependent, or contingent on personal desires. "Categorical" is a conditional requirement or command (i.e., your personal ends). By contrast, "imperative" is a requirement on you regardless of what your personal desires are.

The categorical imperative comes directly out of Strict Father (Universal Reason) issues certain commands, and you must follow them to the letter. Your needs are irrelevant. Your purposes are irrelevant. It is defined as

There is one imperative which immediately commands a certain conduct without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is categorical. It is not concerned with the matter of the action and its intended result, but rather with the form of the action and the principle from which it follows. (*Grounding* 416)

Being moral is doing your duty. Doing your duty is acting out of respect for moral law and nothing else. Therefore, morality cannot be based on any feelings, needs, or purposes you might happen to have. Each version of the categorical imperative is a universal, unconditional, and absolutely binding moral law.

To get a sense of what Kant is proposing, here are paraphrases of his four versions, all of which he considers equivalent.

1. Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it can become a universal law.
2. Act always so as to treat humanity (yourself or others) always as an end and never as a means only.
3. Act only according to those principles that, through universal reason, you give to yourself as universal moral laws.
4. Act so as to create a kingdom of ends.

The examples that Kant gives might sound on the surface as if they were part of a Nurturant Parent morality, or perhaps expressions of a principle of universal love, or just directives to be nice to people: Act as you think everyone should act; treat people as ends-in-themselves, not means; respect their freedom; be fair; be a moral idealist.

But it is easy to see that these are neither products of a Nurturant Parent morality, nor based on feelings of empathy, nor guidelines from Miss Manners. First, if you follow these prescriptions, your actions cannot be based on feelings such as love, or empathy, or friendship. These are ruled out of any moral considerations, because they are not based on Universal Reason.

Second, these are universal, absolutely binding moral laws that you have to obey. Being moral is obeying them for their own sake and for no other reason or motive. Whatever the effects of one's actions on others, it reduces morality to following the law only out of respect for law itself.

Third, the imperative to treat people always as ends-in-themselves, however noble as a principle of respect, is ultimately based on a principle of preserving

individual freedom and is not essentially about nurturance, empathy, love, or kindness. Rather it is about freedom and independence, as construed within the Strict Father moral tradition. It is not that there is anything bad about freedom. Quite the contrary. It is to be cherished. But Kant's imperative always places freedom and independence first, giving it absolute priority over all other values in all circumstances. It *always* takes priority over love, community building, respect for nature, empathy, and so on. That is what makes it a Strict Father principle.

### What This Means for Kantian Morality

So what? So Kantian morality *is* Strict Father morality. One imagines an orthodox Kantian saying, "Okay, so it is Strict Father morality, and rightly so, since that is the morality dictated by pure practical reason, subject to a few minor clarifications and revisions. You've simply found a clever way to describe the morality that issues from Universal Reason and that holds for all rational beings." There are several replies.

First, the cognitive analysis we've given explains what has hitherto resisted explanation, namely, how Kant's moral theory hangs together. It shows how it is a product of commonplace folk theories and metaphors of the Enlightenment. Moreover, it shows how Kant's logic follows from those folk theories and metaphors. Kant's doctrines do not come out of thin air; nor are they merely a random list. They are a product of one of the most systematic minds of all time, and we believe we have revealed a central part of the system. In addition, this analysis shows Kant to be using ordinary modes of reason—metaphors and folk theories common to his philosophical tradition—with extraordinary systematicity and originality.

Second, Kant's use of metaphoric reason shows that his moral theory does not emerge from "pure practical reason," which is supposedly literal and disembodied. But this, in itself, contradicts the very foundation of his moral theory. It is sobering to realize that Kant's moral theory is absolutely based on a view of concepts and reasoning that is inconsistent with empirical results in the cognitive sciences. Every aspect of second-generation cognitive science is at odds with the account of reason that Kant requires. What this means is that empirical results about the nature of mind can contradict philosophical theories of morality. Cognitive science presents us with an "is" that can contradict an "ought." When this happens, we maintain, we must opt for the most cogni-

tively realistic position that is supported by empirical evidence about the nature of mind.

This does not mean that Kant's theory is wrong. One learns enormous amounts about the mind from cognitive science. But the thrust of his theory that the foundation of morality is something that does not and cannot exist outside of moral concepts, such as respect, freedom, and the Strict Father perspective, which is central to the Christian tradition. We have a great deal to learn from analyzing such concepts and theories.

Finally, Kant's idea that the foundation of morality has nothing to do with either human feelings or emotions is absurd. At best, it is a narrow and one-sided view that captures only a small part of what morality is about. At its worst, it misses the very moral ends. As Antonio Damasio (1994), people with brain damage that gives them access to emotion simply cannot function in a moral environment. They certainly cannot function in a moral environment. The idea of a pure reason that can function without emotion is empirically untenable.

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This does not mean that Kant has nothing to teach us about morality. Far  
from it. One learns enormous amounts from reading Kant. But what we have  
learned about the mind from cognitive science does invalidate the central  
thrust of his theory that the foundations of morality lie in pure reason—some-  
thing that does not and cannot exist. Kant's moral philosophy articulates key  
moral concepts, such as respect, freedom, autonomy, and moral law, from a  
Strict Father perspective, which has played a major role in the Protestant  
Christian tradition. We have a great deal to learn from his genius in systemati-  
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captures only a small part of what goes into moral reasoning and the choice of  
moral ends. At its worst, it misses most of what is really important in our  
moral thinking. As Antonio and Hannah Damasio have demonstrated (B1,  
Damasio 1994), people with brain lesions that leave them reasoning without  
access to emotion simply cannot function in appropriate ways in a social envi-  
ronment. They certainly cannot function morally. This is an empirical result.  
The idea of a pure reason that can function in the moral domain independent  
of emotion is empirically untenable.